This paper tests a credit channel of monetary policy (especially a bank-lending channel) in the housing market. We argue that the relevance of the credit channel depends on the structural features of the housing finance system, in particular efficiency and institutional organisation. We employ a VAR approach to analyse this issue in four housing markets (Finland, Germany, Norway and the UK). Our results support the existence of a broad credit channel and, in some contexts, of a banklending channel. More importantly, the findings show across countries a clear -cut relationship between presence of a credit (bank-lending) channel, efficiency of housing finance and type of institutions active in mortgage provision.
Introduction
Since Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , the literature has shown a renewed interest in the credit channel of monetary policy. According to this view, widespread imperfections in the credit market, such as asymmetric information or imperfect contract enforceability, result for consumers and firms in a wedge between the opportunity cost of internal funds and the cost of external funds. In turn, this external finance premium depends on monetary policy. Tight monetary policy not only raises market rates of interest but also the external finance premium, thus discouraging investment and consumption. The explanations of this link are twofold. The balance-sheet view argues that the bridge between monetary policy and the external finance premium is represented by the financial position of borrowers. Tight money affects borrowers' net worth, either reducing their current cash flows (increasing interest on debt burdens) or the value of their pledgeable assets. This feeds back on the external finance premium required by external lenders. The bank-lending channel view, on the other hand, focuses on lenders' financial status. Tight money drains reserves and retail deposits on the liability side of banks' balance-sheets. Faced with this deposit drain, banks can react by increasing their funding through managed liabilities (such as certificates of deposit) or shrinking assets (loans and securities). In the presence of an upward sloping supply for managed liabilities, banks may find it too costly to fully offset the reduction in retail deposits and opt to reduce their assets.
The lending view argues that the impact is relatively stronger on loans than on securities. In fact loans and securities are imperfect substitutes because loans are riskier and less liquid.
Therefore tight money causes an inward shift of credit supply that especially affects borrowers with limited access to non-bank sources of external funding.
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There are three main motivations for our paper. First, housing markets feature puzzles in terms of quantity and of price dynamics hard to reconcile with the traditional monetary transmission mechanism. For instance, as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) observe, the response of residential investment to innovations in short-term rates is generally sharp and persistent.
This feature does not match the dynamic response of long-term rates (the ones that mainly drive residential expenditure) that traditionally under-react to innovations in short-term rates and revert fast to their initial level. Secondly, as argued in Section 2.1, there are reasons to expect that the housing market is particularly exposed to the credit channel, hence representing a better environment to capture its presence than the broader economy. Finally, by exploiting the cross-country heterogeneity in housing finance systems, we can verify whether there exists a "reasonable" link b etween institutional context and evidence of a credit channel, thus offering an important robustness check for our findings.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the credit channel in the housing market emphasising the role of the structural features of the housing finance system (2.1), especially its institutional framework (2.2) and its efficiency (2.3). Section 3 explains the empirical methodology (3.1 and 3.2) and presents the results of the empirical analysis (3.3). Section 4 concludes. Appendix 1 and 2 respectively describe the structural characteristics of the housing markets analysed and the data used.
The credit channel and housing finance systems

The credit channel sensitivity of housing
The credit channel of monetary policy can be expected to be relatively effective in the housing market. Starting from the balance-sheet channel, "housing demand is linked directly to consumer balance-sheets by features like down-payment requirements, up-front transaction cos ts, like closing costs and 'points' and minimum income-to-interest payment ratios" (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995 , page 45). 2 The lending channel is also likely to be relatively strong both at the source (depository institutions) and at the destination (house holds). At the source, in countries where mortgage standardisation and securitisation are not widespread, the relative illiquidity of mortgages could matter. If banks want to keep a buffer against liquidity shocks, they might be encouraged to shift from less to more liquid loans or to securities. At the destination a fall in bank mortgages will probably result in actual lack of funds for house purchases whenever mortgage funding from specialist mortgage lenders or from the State is not a sufficient buffer. In fact, households have inherently less financing opportunities than firms.
Credit channel and the institutions for real estate finance
The first structural aspect that can affect the credit channel in the housing market (especially the bank-lendin g channel) is the institutional organisatio n of the housing finance system. Broadly speaking, the systems of the countries that we analyse (Finland, Germany, Norway, and the UK) can be grouped as follows: i. Bank model (Finland, UK, in part Germany);
ii. Mortgage bond model (in part Germany); iii. State model (Norway and in part Finland).
The bank model is characterised by a strong presence of depository institutions (banks and mortgage banks) in mortgage provision. In the early 1990's, Finnish banks provided about 80% of housing funding (Nordic Council, 1992) . In the UK, depository institutions have a market share of around 90%. In Germany, commercial and savings banks and credit cooperatives cover about 45% of the market competing mainly with mortgage banks and Bausparkassen. The banking system is the strongest candidate for a bank-lending channel. The dependence of borrowers on depository institutions is generally high. Moreover, the amount of loanable funds is likely to depend strongly on monetary policy, because of the general reliance of banks on reservable retail deposits. In particular, banking systems with low concentration are more prone to the existence of a lending channel, given the traditional difficulty of small banks in accessing wholesale funding (Guiso et al., 1999) .
The mortgage bond model is characterised by the strong role of specialist mortgage institutions (mortgage banks). These intermediaries fund themselves mainly through the wholesale market. For instance, German mortgage banks fund themselves issuing mortgage and municipal bonds to institutional investors. German Bausparkassen, instead, rely on savings generated from long-term (6-18 years) housing linked contracts and on government subsidies.
Because of this funding mechanism, the mortgage bond model is less likely to be characterised by a bank-lending channel. Monetary policy is likely to have limited credit supply effects if specialist mortgage lenders with easy access to wholesale funding are major players and offer contracts highly substitutable to those of depository institutions.
Finally, the State model is characterised by a relevant State involvement (directly or indirectly trough public banks). In Finland, the State Housing Fund provides between 10% and 20% of mortgage loans. In Norway, this figure has averaged around 40% in the 1990's. State mortgage loans are generally restricted to social housing (Finland) or to particular categories of beneficiaries (Norway).
Credit channel and the efficiency of housing finance
The second structural feature that is likely to affect the importance of a credit channel is the "efficiency" of the housing finance system. In particular, three aspects are relevant for the presence of a credit channel: a) depth of the funding system for housing finance institutions; b) presence of a diversified range of mortgage lenders and c) sharing of credit risk.
A deeper market for wholesale funding can undermine at the source the effectiveness of a bank-lending channel by reducing the dependence of housing finance institutions on retail deposits. A wider, diversified range of mortgage finance institutions can weaken at the destination the bank-lending channel reducing the dependence of households' house purchases on bank credit. The sharing of credit risk, instead, mainly determines the strength of the balance-sheet channel, as we clarify below.
The efficiency of a housing finance system is the result of the historical evolution of the system and of regulatory constraints. A regulatory ceiling on de posit rates can prevent banks, after tight money, from offsetting the drain in deposits by increasing the return paid to depositors. Similar arguments apply for restrictions on market funding. In the past, depository institutions in some countries have bee n prevented from issuing bonds in the open market 3 , which has implied a strong link between retail deposits and assets. Entry restrictions are again likely to strengthen the bank-lending channel allowing a smaller range of lenders alternative to depository institutions. For these reasons, the lending channel is likely to have become weaker after the financial liberalisation that occurred in many countries during the 1980's. 4 Risk sharing is mainly reflected in the level of minimum income-to-interest-payment ratios and of down-payment requirements. These quantitative controls affect the link between borrower's net worth and the availability of funds from bank and non-bank intermediaries. It is unclear in this case whether financial liberalisation has significantly altered the strength of these balance-sheet effects (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) . 3 This was for instance the case for UK Building Societies whose ceiling on funds raised from the market was increased from 20% to 40% by the Building Society Act of 1987. 4 The abolition of interest rate ceilings and of portfolio and entry restrictions would have respectively deepened the market for banks' liabilities and reduced the dependence of households on banks for mortgage funding. Table 1 classifies the housing finance systems of Finland, Germany, Norway and the UK according to institutional framework and level of efficiency 5 , in the three aspects previously indicated. 6 As the Table shows , we choose this set of countries because they display strongly diverse housing finance systems, hence fulfilling the heterogeneity criterion mentioned among the motivations of the paper. Appendix 1 provides additional evidence in support of this argument : however, the classification is only meant as an approximate qualitative guide for the interpretation of the empirical results and should not be overstated. 
Econometric evidence
Several studies provide a theoretical background for our econometric analysis, even though they focus on the aggregate economy rather than on the housing market. 8 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) analyze the transmission of monetary policy in a general equilibrium framework in which the strength of firms' balance-sheets affects their debt capacity. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) provide instead a theoretical analysis of the banklending channel in an extended IS-LM framework.
Empirical methodology
For each country, we run four VARs in order to assess the presence of a credit channel of monetary transmission and to disentangle a balance-sheet from a bank-lending channel. 9 As explained in the next subsection, we f ollow Gali (1992) 9 The variables used and the identification scheme are summarised in Table 2 . Appendix 2 describes data sources and time periods used in the regressions. 10 See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (199 8) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) for models that generate long-run monetary neutrality while being consistent with the assumption that contemporaneous output and the price level do not respond to a monetary policy shock. 11 A reduction in loans is not even a necessary condition for a credit channel: households could try to compensate a reduction in wealth by borrowing more from external sources. Hence tight money could elicit an increase in loan demand that, if strong enough, could overwhelm any contraction in loan supply resulting from a credit channel.
Spread encounters three major problems. First, the price is only one of the terms of mortgage contracts: for instance, an increase in the default probability of the borrower could result in higher required collateral rather than higher mortgage rate. Second, if quantity rationing were pervasive in the credit market, the Spread would fail to capture an increase in non-price rationing of mortgage demand. Finally, in the 1980's some of the analysed countries have witnessed a progressive shift from long-term, fixed mortgage rates to variable, reviewable and renegotiable ones. The Spread between a variable mortgage rate and a long-term benchmark rate could also reflect a liquidity premium (possibly timevarying) not associated with agency or monitoring costs. As mentioned above, we tr ied to match the maturity of the benchmark safe rate with the actual length of fixity of the mortgage rate in order to overcome this problem.
Moreover, unavailability of detailed data on mortgage rates applied by different lenders prevents us from using the analysis of the Spread to disentangle a lending from a balancesheet channel (for instance detecting whether the Spread on bank mortgages increases more than that on mortgages from non-depository institutions). Hence, we generally focus on the spread on mortgages by depository institutions or the spread on an average mortgage rate (Germany) inferring from its behaviour only information on the existence of a broad credit channel (balance-sheet and/or bank-lending).
3 The analysis of the finance Mix was first proposed by Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) (who analysed the response of the Mix between bank loans and commercial paper to innovations in the Fed Funds rate) and has been used in the analysis of a lending channel in the automobile market (Ludvigson, 1998) . As stressed by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) , the Mix does not completely solve the endogeneity problem. In particular, a change of the Mix could capture a change in the quality composition of borrowers. Suppose that banks specialize in funding households with a weak financial position. An increase of the Mix after tight money could reflect a "flight to quality" from risky households to households with a stronger financial status. In this case, the increase of the Mix would be the result of the working of a households' balance-sheet channel rather than of a bank-lending channel.
Therefore, whenever the combined evidence from the third and the fourth VARs hints at the presence of a bank-lending channel, we will carry out a robustness analysis to rule out this alternative explanation. In particular, in order to assess whether depository institutions fund riskier households than non-depository ones, we will use evidence on the risk of mortgages, as proxied, for example, by the default ratio of mortgages, by the number of repossessions, or by the amount of loan loss provisions made by the mortgage financiers.
In all the specifications we us e house prices as a cyclical indicator in the housing market.
In principle, another way to test for the presence of a credit channel in the housing market would be to analyse the behaviour of housing investment. There are reasons to believe that house pric es are more suitable to our analysis. First of all, since in the housing market quantities adjust sluggishly, prices could be more informative in capturing changes in housing demand in the short run. Secondly, house prices can play a crucial role in the transmission of monetary policy working through credit supply shifts. On the one hand, house prices affect borrowers' (homeowners) wealth and credit capacity (for the oretical models see Stein, 1995, and Ortalo-Magnè and Rady, 1999). 13 On the other, they influence lenders' net worth and, potentially, the amount of credit they extend. Specifying the VARs using quantities rather than prices would omit these interactions.
Identifying the shocks
We identify the monetary shocks in VARs 1, 2 and 3 using a combination of short and long-run restrictions. In particular, we adopt the common trends approach as developed by King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (KPSW, 1991). The approach uses the cointegration properties of the data to achieve identification using both short and long run restrictions. When a group of variables in a VAR is cointegrated, a useful specification for their dynamics is a 13 For a financial accelerator in an aggregate environment based on changes in the price of hard assets see vector-error -correction model (VECM). A VECM places reduced rank restrictions on the matrix of long run impacts from a VAR. KPSW distinguish between structural shocks with permanent effects on the level of the variables from those with only temporary effects. The permanent shocks are the sources of the so-called common stochastic trends among the series.
The number of these shocks equals the number of variables in the system less the cointegrating relationships between them. The remaining transitory shocks equal the number of cointegrating relationships (intuitively, a cointegrating vector identifies a linear combination of the variables that is stationary, so that shocks to it do not eliminate the steady state in such a system).
The VAR model needs not to be fully identified: partial identification of either the transitory or permanent shocks is possible. Furthermore, one can separate the transitory shocks by adding some untested restriction on their impact effect.
We identify the monetary shock as the transitory innovation that does not affect contemporaneously GDP and CPI inflation, but that can have impact effects on all the other varia bles. In addition, the shock also has to satisfy long run neutrality, both by having zero long run effect on GDP (and the other real variables)
and by keeping relative prices of houses and consumer goods constant. 14 Therefore, GDP, inflation, real house pr ices and all other variables will revert back to their initial steady state once the effects of the shock die out.
We run augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on the levels of the series. 15 The tests suggest that the variables are integrated of order 1. 16 The results from the cointegration tests are mixed, but tend to indicate , in the first three VARs, at least three cointegrating vectors: one vector could correspond to a long-run stationary real interest rate (cointegration between 14 The monetary shock will not affect the relative prices of the two goods in the long run, but the permanent shocks in the VAR (that we do not focus upon here) in general will. However, it can affect the CPI and house price index (by the same amount), since we impose the zero long run restriction on CPI changes, not on levels.
nominal interest rate and inflation), another to a long-run housing supply curve (cointegration between house prices and GDP). The third cointegrating vector could hint, depending on the VAR, at a stable long-run ratio between housing loans and total loans (VAR 1), stationary spread (VAR 2), stationary Mix (VAR 3). For this reason we opt in our specifications for a common rank of 3, with the exception of Norway, where the tests strongly indicate 4 cointegrating vectors. 17 On the basis of this, we specify the first three VARs in the form of a vector error correction model (VECM). 18 As we will see, our way of identifying tight money by use of short and long run restrictions turns out to be successful, as the contractionary monetary shock will elicit a rise in the interest rate and a negative response of GDP and inflation, which are all suggestive of a tight monetary policy stance. As is well known (see Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans, 2000), this is evidence per se of the success of our selection scheme, since our impulse responses can account for the qualitative features of a wide range of monetary business cycle models in which money shocks have delayed, transitory effects on economic activity. 19 In VAR 4, in order to identify a Mix shock we use a recursive scheme, ordering the Mix after GDP and consumer price inflation and before real house prices. Economic theory is in fact silent about the permanent effects of a Mix innovation. 16 In Germany, the unit root null hypothesis for inflation, interest rates and real house prices is rejected. However, it is not necessary that each time series in a common trends model is non -stationary. Loosely speaking, a stationary variable is simply cointegrated with itself, and can therefore fit in a common trends representation. 17 The identification restrictions imposed on the monetary shock are similar to all other cases. 18 Each model is estimated with a lag length of 2 to 4, depending on which was sufficient to get serially uncorrelated residuals. 19 As a robustness check, we also estimated the impulse response without imposing the long run zero restrictions using a Choleski decomposition of the residuals and ordering the interest rate after GDP and CPI inflation. The results of this specification were similar to those reported here.
Country specific results
A. Finland
The evidence supports the existence of a bank-lending channel and leaves room for a balance-sheet channel. Figure 2 .A shows the responses of real hous ing and total loans to a monetary contraction, using quarterly data from 1978Q4 to 1999Q4, along with one standard error asymptotic confidence bands. Both housing and total loans fall after tight money. Figure 2 .B shows the response of the Spread between mortgage rate on new housing loans by banks and 3-year benchmarking interest rate 20 to a negative monetary shock. 21 The Spread increases significantly about three periods after the contraction. Its behaviour hints therefore at the existence of a broad credit channel.
In addition, the analysis of the finance Mix supports the workings of a bank-lending channel. We construct the Mix as the sum of housing loans by the State plus other minor nondepository lenders over housing loans by all institutions (including commercial, savings and cooperative banks) and analyse its behaviour in two steps. First, using data from 1987Q1 to 1999Q4 (that is after the liberalisation of interest rates), we find a significant, persistent increase in the Mix following tight money (Figure 2 .C). This result looks consistent with the structural characteristics of the Finnish market for housing finance. Finnish banks rely strongly on retail sight deposits (EMF, 2000) and their access to wholesale funding occurs at a higher cost than for mortgage credit institutions in other Nordic countries (Kosonen, 1993, and Booth et al., 1994) . The finding also suggests that financial liberalisation could have had a minor role 20 The benchmark rate maturity reflects the fact that in Finland loans have typically adjustable rates with adjustment periods of 3-5 years (Kosonen, 1993) . 21 Here the sample includes quarterly data from 1988Q1 to 1999Q4. Therefore the sample extends entirely after the abolition of interest rate ceilings (occurred in 1987).
in weakening a bank-lending channel at the source (i.e. increasing the substitutability between retail deposits and wholesale funding). 22 We then analyse the impact of the Mix shock ( funding is restricted to social housing (rental, cooperative and owner occupied) and to financing the construction of single-family houses. Moreover state loans are means -tested. As a result, the substitutability between private-bank and alternative funding is likely to be imperfect, implying the relevance of mortgage distribution for households' house purchases.
As previously argued, an alternative explanation for the response of the Mix to a monetary shock could be that in Finland this response reflects a change in the quality composition of borrowers. A strategy for disentangling a "flight to quality" is analyzing whether depository institutions fund riskier borrowers than non-depository ones. 23 Unlike for the UK (see below), data on mortgage defaults in Finland are not available. Therefore, we test this hypothesis using an indirect approach. We obtained annual data on loan loss provisions of Finnish credit institutions for the period 1996-2000 from the international rating agency Fitch IBCA. 24 The data include loan loss provisions of a major non-depository housing finance institution 22 Financial liberalisation in the second half of the 1980's resulted in Finland in the abolition of the ceilings on deposit and mortgage rates and in the progressive deepening of the market for bank bonds. 23 In the context of the automobile market, Ludgvison (1998) compares the average default rate on automobile loans extended by banks with that on automobile loans extended by car finance companies.
(Municipality Housing Finance) and of the wide majority of Finnish depository institutions. 25 We then compared the ratio (loan loss provisions divided by total loans) of the Municipality
Housing Finance with the average ratio of the depository institutions in the sample. Since data on loss provisions for depository institutions bundle together mortgages with other types of loans and, hence, can imperfectly capture the risk of mortgages, we also compared the ratio of the Municipality Housing Finance with that of a major depository institution specialized in mortgage financing (Oko Mortgage Bank Ltd.). If depository institutions specialize in financing mortgages with high probability of default, we would expect them to have a higher ratio (loan-loss provisions/total loans). Instead, in both comparisons, this ratio was lower for the Municipality Housing Finance. 27 Clearly, this evidence should be interpreted with caution since it is limited to one non-depository institution, though a major one, and it covers only a sub-period of the Mix analysis. However, it suggests that depository institutions have no systematic tendency to fund riskier borrowers than non-depository ones.
B. Germany
We find evidence of a balance-sheet channel but no evidence of a bank -lending channel. Figure 3 .A shows responses of total loans and housing loans by banks, using data from 1974Q2 to 1998Q4. 28 A monetary contraction leads to a significant decline in total bank loans.
Housing loans are virtually unchanged. This could be due to long-term relationships between 25 Data on alternative measures of the risk of loans, such as loan loss reserves and amount of non-performing loans, were not available for many institutions, including the Municipality Housing Finance. 27 In particular, the ratio equals 0.28% for the Municipality Housing Finance, 0.28% for the depository institutions and 0.06% for the Oko Mortgage Bank Ltd. 28 The availability of relatively long time-series and the absence of significant structural changes in the regulation of the housing finance system led us to use relatively long time periods in the analyses. The regression for the Spread starts in 1982, as we found consistent time series for the interest rates only starting after that date.
banks and customers that induce banks to insulate their loan portfolios from monetary disturbances.
The Spread between the average 10 year fixed mortgage rate and the government 10 year bond yield widens after a monetary contraction and stays positive for about 3 years ( Figure   3 .B). Even if in the 1990's mortgages with fixed rate have been originated also by commercial and savings banks, they are more typical of non-depository institutions, such as mortgage banks or Bausparkassen. Since the latter are shielded from fluctuations in reservable deposits, the increase in our Spread could capture the effect on the external finance premium of deterioration in borrowers' net worth (i.e. a balance-sheet channel).
We then analyse the Mix, using data from 1974Q2 to 1998Q4. To obtain the Mix, we consolidate all the institutions traditionally relying on reservable, short-term retail deposits. We then construct the Mix as the sum of housing loans from Bausparkassen and Mortgage Banks over total hous ing loans from all financial institutions. 29 Tight money (Figure 3 .C) leads to a rise in the Mix, which displays a hump-shaped response, peaking after two years and returning to the baseline after four. This seems consistent with the characteristics of the German market for funding. According to Diamond and Lea (1992) , German funding markets are segmented.
First, they feature relative sluggishness of market deposit rates. More important is the segmentation of the bond market. In particular, commercial and savings banks can issue unsecured debt but cannot issue mortgage bonds (unlike mortgage banks). They are also strongly discouraged by the regulator from issuing derivative securities. As a result, banks rely mainly on retail general funding and especially o n savings deposits (EMF, 2000). The behaviour of the Mix can also be explained by the degree of concentration of the banking system. Except for the three big banks, the system is made by a network of small banks with 29 The denominator includes therefore, besides mortgages from the two mentioned institutions, mortgages from commercial, savings, regional banks and from credit cooperatives. The definition of housing loans includes difficult access to the wholesale marke t. In particular, the main financiers of house purchases are savings banks and credit cooperatives (approximately two thirds of bank housing loans once we exclude mortgage banks). There is a vast range of sizes among these banks but the majority is small and operates on a regional basis.
The Mix shock (Figure 3 .D) does not affect real house prices significantly, indicating good substitutability of depository institution mortgages with mortgages from other institutions. This result is not surprising. The mortgage market in Germany appears well diversified and competitive (Diamond and Lea, 1992) . Although depository and nondepository institutions offer contracts which are not entirely homogeneous , especially in the length and in the rate (fixed or renegotiable), these differences do not appear to justify a marked non-substitutability.
C. Norway
We find lack of evidence of a credit channel. (for redevelopment etc.). 30 Interest rates on mortgage loans from banks were available for Norway starting only in 1995. Before that date, we used the interest rate on long and medium term loans. The bulk of mortgage loans in Norway have reviewable rates, but a non marginal fraction has renegotiable rates. For this reason, and for the likely pooling with loans with medium-long-term fixed rates, we opted for a medium term rate as benchmark.
savings banks' share in the market had risen to around 80%. Finally, finance and credit companies that fund themselves mainly through the wholesale market cover a minor share. We construct the Mix as the sum of loans from state and non-depository financial institutions over total housing loans. 31 In fact, concentration in the banking system is quite low with the strong presence of a myriad of small savings banks alongside a few medium-sized commercial banks.
D. The United Kingdom
The evidence supports the existence of a bank-lending channel and leaves room for a balance-sheet channel. 31 As shown in Figure 1 , because of the declining importance of public funding the Mix exhibits a strong decline over the whole sample passing from 45% in late 1980's to a value of little more than 15% at the end of the 1990's. 32 The EMF also reports that "from 1995 until 1998 Norwegian banks have faced a much faster growth in lending than in deposits and have increasingly relied on funding from other sources..." (2000, page 29) 34 Here the VAR runs from 1985Q1 to 1999Q4 (a period that extends after the UK housing finance system reforms of the 1980's including the 1986 Building Societies Act). We choose a three-month rate as benchmark because the majority of mortgages in UK have a rate reviewable at the discretion of the lender.
The first VAR runs from 1978Q1 to 1999Q4. Tight money reduces on impact mortgages of depository institutions. Total loans decline only slightly and with some lag (Figure 5 .A).
Real house prices react with the expected negative sign.
The response of the Spread between the average mortgage rate on building societies mortgages and the 3-months Treasury bill rate ( Figure 5 .B) offers tentative evidence of a broad credit channel. 34 The Spread stays margina lly positive for about 3 years.
We construct the Mix as housing loans of non-depository financial institutions, insurance As for Finland, an alternative expla nation for the response of the Mix to a monetary shock could be a change in the quality composition of borrowers. To assess this alternative hypothesis , we obtained data on property repossessions and mortgage arrears. 36 Under the hypothesis that non-depository mortgage institutions fund less risky borrowers, the number of repossessions and mortgage arrears should fall when the Mix increases. We regressed the number of repossessions 37 as a fraction of mortgage loans on the Mix and on cyclical indicators of the housing market (house prices) and the economy (GDP and inflation). We found that an increase of the Mix positively affects the ratio re possessions over mortgage loans . 38 This would suggest that in the UK, contrarily to the "flight to quality" argument, nondepository mortgage financiers tend to fund riskier borrowers than depository institutions. The effect of the Mix on house prices is instead in line with reasonable expectations.
Having aggressively entered the mortgage market in the 1980's, non-depository institutions 36 The data are provided from the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) . They are available on a half-annual basis from 1991H1 to 2001H2 on mortgages in arrear between three and six months, between six and twelve months and beyond twelve months. 37 We did a similar exercise for mortgage arrears, obtaining similar results. 38 For reasons of space, we do not report the estimation results, which are available from the authors. We tried several specifications. In the most parsimonious ones, we included only the Mix and house prices as regressors, while in the extended regressions we also included the indicators for macroeconomic conditions and a linear trend variable. We also tried different lag structures, including the regressors in their contemporaneous values, lagged one or two semesters. Consistently across regressions, the coefficients on the explanatory variables had the expected signs. In particular, house prices and GDP inversely affect repossessions (arrears), while the interest rate has a positive effect on them.
39 See Diamond and Lea (1992) .
have seen their market share declining in the 1990's ( Figure 1, bottom row   40 ). 41 With a market share of less than 10%, they probably represent too tiny a buffer to effectively shield households from a reduction in mortgages from banks and building societies. As suggested by Kashyap and Stein (1994) , in the presence of non-negligible costs from switching from one lender to the other the argument of the "marginal" lender could fail, and the relative sizes of the bank and non bank intermediary sectors could matter. 
Conclusions
We have analysed and tested the presence of a bank-lending channel and more generally of a credit channel in four European housing markets characterised by different institutional frameworks and different leve ls of efficiency in the funding and mortgage systems. The results suggest that, despite the process of integration, residual heterogeneity characterises European housing markets and eventually, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Table 3 summari ses the econometric evidence. While robust evidence of a bank-lending channel emerges for Finland and the UK, we find at most evidence of a balance-sheet channel for Germany, and lack of evidence of a credit channel for Norway.
The Finnish housing finance system, despite financial liberalisation, is affected by frictions: banks heavily rely on retail deposit funding and have a predominant role in mortgage origination. Similarly, despite mortgage product standardisation and a competitive environment, the UK housing finance system heavily relies on depository institutions with a limited role for alternative mortgage lenders. At the opposite extreme, Norway has enjoyed a 40 The figure also includes a negligible, declining market share of the Government. 41 According to Lea, Welter and Dubel (1997) , following the sharp rise of market rates in 1988, centralised lenders were hit both financially and in originations with heavy pre-payments as they had to adjust their rates when the funding rate index (Libor) changed. Banks and building societies could avoid this adjustment because retail savings rates sluggishly responded to market rates.
clear improvement in the funding mechanisms of housing finance institutions and greater competition among mortgage financiers. Finally, the rigidity of the German markets, marginally affected by deregulation, explains the evidence of a balance -sheet channel suggested by the behaviour of the Spread; the lack of a bank-lending channel could be the byproduct of the historical richness of non-depository mortgage providers.
Throughout the paper we have avoided quantitative comparisons across countries, limiting our analysis to qualitative differences in the sign, shape and significance level of the VAR impulse responses. We think that, in order to address the transmission of monetary policy, this approach is relatively safe even if our conclusions should still be treated with caution.
The normative implications of the paper for the conduct of monetary policy are relevant.
In a framework with a single monetary policy (which is the case for Germany and Finland and in perspective for the UK), the choice of the appropriate intermediate targets can encounter relevant difficulties with strongly asymmetric t ransmission channels. The question then becomes whether the process of integration or phenomena like the diffusion of mortgage securitization will progressively sweep these asymmetries away.
42 It would seem therefore that neither the increased freedom of entry in the market for housing finance nor the relaxation of funding restrictions and liberalisation of market rates have led to a full flexibility of the UK system. commercial banks: retail deposits (50%), wholesale general funding (47%); savings banks: retail deposits (61%), wholesale general funding (37%); (source: EMF 2000) Germany:
Mortgage bonds, mortgage backed securities, deposits (exact figures not available) 
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Appendix 2: Data description
Summary tables of time periods and variables used in the regressions (source in brackets).
Loans regressions
Country Years Variables
Finland Variables: Y (real GDP), DP (consumer price inflation), R (money market rate), HP (real house prices), HL (real housing loans from banks), BL (real total loans from banks), SP (mortgage rate, RM, minus benchmark safe rate, RL), MIX (ratio of housing loans from "non-banks" to total housing loans). 
